a statutory scheme, designed to address the issue of derivative actions, came into force. The scheme provided that shareholders wishing to continue (or commence) derivative proceedings in relation to wrongs committed against their company had to obtain the permission/leave of the court. In the subsequent seven years there have been few derivative actions instituted by shareholders and only a small percentage of actions commenced have succeeded in obtaining court permission/leave to proceed. This article undertakes an analytical review of the statutory scheme and identifies reasons why there are so few proceedings in the UK, and more broadly it examines and evaluates the derivative action scheme itself. The paper considers whether the statutory scheme is too narrow and explores some changes that might be made to it in order to make it more accessible and more effective.
and no one else, must bring proceedings in relation to that cause of action. In the past it has sometimes been known as "the proper plaintiff rule." Whether legal proceedings are to be instituted or not is the decision of the company's board of directors. This is because theoretically boards of directors are regarded as being legitimately vested with control of companies, and a company's articles of association will normally vest the board with very broad general management powers. 2 However, a board might decide, in relation to any given cause of action that is available, not to commence proceedings on behalf of the company.
This could be for a variety of reasons. The classic situation is where the cause of action is against a person who is the controlling shareholder, an associate of such a shareholder or one or more of the directors of the company. The courts took the view in the nineteenth century that this state of affairs could produce injustice so they provided that on occasions a shareholder could bring proceedings on behalf of the company. These proceedings came to be known as derivative claims. 3 For many years derivative claims were provided for at common law until a statutory derivative proceedings scheme was introduced, in the Companies Act 2006 ("the Act"), following the approach extant in many Commonwealth countries. 4 The reason for enacting a statutory scheme for derivative actions 5 was the simplification and modernisation of the law in order to improve its accessibility as the common law system lacked clarity and was inaccessible. 6 Also, the existence of a statutory scheme was to ensure that the company receives an appropriate remedy, usually For instance, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ghana, South Africa, Singapore. 5 See Civil Procedure Rules, r.19.9A(2) which requires an application is to be made for permission when a claim form for a derivative action is issued. In Scotland leave has to be sought before derivative proceedings can be commenced.
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This was conducted on 1 September 2015. 12 The search was based on locating applications for permission to continue derivative actions up to 1 September 2015. One application was not reported. We know this as the appeal from the application hearing was reported. See average of 2.75 cases per year, which is actually less than that found in a study conducted in 2010 . 15 The figures obtained are likely to represent all attempts to pursue derivative action as leave (Scotland and Northern Ireland) or permission (England and Wales) must be secured before a derivative action can either be instituted (Scotland) or continued (England and Wales and Northern Ireland), and it is likely that all instances of applications will have been reported given the interest in the field. The paucity of cases rebuts concerns that some had before the introduction of the scheme that it would lead to an avalanche of proceedings.
The article undertakes an analytical review of the statutory scheme, which is warranted given the fact that it has now been in operation for in excess of eight years. Specifically, the article identifies reasons why there are so few proceedings in the UK and more broadly examines and evaluates the derivative action regime. The paper considers whether the present statutory scheme is too narrow and explores some changes that might be made to the statutory scheme in order to make it more effective. After providing some background the paper examines possible reasons for the paucity of proceedings. Following this it explores possible modifications that could be made to the regime. Next the article examines the approach taken by the judiciary as far as applications for permission or leave are concerned. The following two sections of the article then focus on two major issues, namely costs and the use of unfair prejudice petitions by shareholders in lieu of derivative actions. Finally, there is a 14 All of the cases dealt with permission hearings. Cases, such as multiple-derivative actions, based on the common law procedure were not included. A "multiple-derivative" action is a derivative action that is entitled to be brought by minority shareholders of a parent company for a breach of duty owed to a direct or indirect subsidiary, certainly where control of the subsidiary is not independent of the parent company's board. These applications are not brought under the statutory scheme but under the common law. See conclusion. It is not intended to provide an analysis of the statutory scheme's individual provisions as that has been done previously by several commentators. 16 For ease of exposition references will be to the provisions of the Act that apply to England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. The provisions applying to Scotland are very similar.
B. BACKGROUND
It is not intended to embark on a lengthy discussion of the theory underpinning, and rationale behind, derivative actions as that has been undertaken on a number of occasions. 17 But it is worth rehearsing the fact that derivative actions exist to provide an effective entry to the courts in order to maintain investor confidence and to deter directorial and other wrongdoing. 18 Derivative actions are seen by many commentators as mechanisms to reduce agency costs. 19 Thus we can say, first, that the derivative action exists to make managers and
directors accountable for what they do in their posts. Second, the action can function as a way of giving some teeth to the process of monitoring of directors that shareholders might undertake. If their monitoring detects wrong then shareholders can do more than simply "jump up and down" and complain. Third, the action, if successful, will lead to the company being compensated in relation to the wrong that has been done to it. Fourth, the action can have done. Of course, this can always be seen as interference in the management of the company, and UK courts as well as courts in other jurisdictions, are usually wary of interfering in the internal affairs of companies save where there are very good grounds for doing so.
Rational shareholders might well reason that it is preferable to exit a company, where they can do so, if the company has been harmed rather than to take derivative action because, on the one hand, the time and possible costs involved, and on the other hand the fact that no benefit will come to the shareholder directly. Nevertheless, the harm caused to the company could have reduced the value of a shareholder's shares that he or she determines that exit is not an appropriate or economical option. In closely held companies exit might not be viable or possible.
Undoubtedly there are grounds for requiring a shareholder to obtain permission before being able to continue a derivative action. Without this requirement a multitude of proceedings could be commenced requiring a company to have to address them all, and thereby causing them unreasonable cost and time, even leading to partial paralysis of their business operations. The requirement also contributes to the position that generally exists in the UK that there should not be interference in the management of companies generally and if there is to be interference then there must be substantial reasons for it.
The gaining of permission is only able to be secured if a shareholder can pass successfully through two stages. First, shareholders have to establish a prima facie case on the merits. 20 The aim of this stage of the permission process is to assess whether the company and the 20 See section 261(2). respondent should be put to the expense and inconvenience of considering and contesting the application for permission. 21 If an application is successful on this point, then the matter proceeds to a second stage. 22 In the second stage, according to section 263(2), 23 a court must refuse permission if it is satisfied that one or more of three criteria exist. There is no discretion given to the courts at this point. But if none of the criteria in section 263(2) apply then the court has a discretion whether to allow the claim to proceed. In the process of exercising this discretion the court must take into account factors that are set out in section 263(3) and (4). The UK courts have, compared with the courts in other jurisdictions, a broad discretion when it comes to permitting shareholders to proceed. For instance, in some jurisdictions, such as Germany, if a person has a certain percentage of the issued share capital of the company then he or she has the right to bring derivative proceedings without the need to obtain permission.
C. THE REASONS FOR FEW PROCEEDINGS
The fact that there have been few proceedings is not of itself a reason for seeking changes to the statutory scheme, but given the fact that all applications for permission are likely to have been reported and the aim of the scheme was to make derivative process more accessible to shareholders it is not an unimportant factor. The experience in the UK is to be contrasted to that in New Zealand where the derivative claim has become popular, manifested by the number of proceedings instituted. The following might be reasons for the paucity of cases in the UK. First, shareholders seem to be using section 994 petitions, alleging unfair prejudice against directors, rather than initiating derivative proceedings, as the same facts might lead to a claim on either basis. This is a matter that is discussed later in some depth. Second, there is a costs element to any action and it might dissuade the institution of proceedings. If a permission action is not successful then an applicant shareholder might not only be liable for his or her costs, but the costs of the other parties. If the applicant were successful a court might order that the company is to pay the costs of the action, but a general costs order does not appear to have been made thus far by any court. Again, this is another matter which will be discussed later.
Third, there is lack of a financial incentive for a shareholder to take the time and incur possible costs that prosecuting derivative actions entails, because any relief ordered will be in favour of the company. A shareholder does not receive any direct benefit from the action that he or she takes. In fact the shareholder might not receive any indirect benefit. While a successful outcome to an action might lead to an increase in the value of shares, this is not guaranteed. In fact, there is data from an American empirical study suggesting that there is little positive impact on share values following successful derivative proceedings. 25 The derivative action might, in relation to larger companies in particular, affect the reputation of the company because of a loss of confidence in the directors, 26 and that might in fact reduce Fourth, shareholders might be dissuaded from taking action because they might feel, with some justification, that the other shareholders are engaging in free-riding. That is, the applicant shareholder is taking all the risks and the other shareholders might well share indirectly in any benefit bestowed on the company by a court in the derivative action. Fifth, as discussed later in the article, the judges do appear to be invoking a fairly strict approach to permission applications, and this might discourage shareholders from taking action. Finally, an action can be pursued only, according to section 260(3), in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company.
D IS THERE A NEED FOR CHANGE?
While the statutory scheme has provided a little more certainty concerning when a derivative action might be initiated, when compared with the position at common law, it has clearly not given much encouragement to shareholders, and arguably has not made the derivative action more accessible for shareholders. As a consequence this part of the article analyses the functioning of the scheme and considers several possible changes that might be introduced.
The Range of Applicants
The UK scheme limits the bringing of derivative actions to members of the company. This is a more limited approach than that found in other jurisdictions. It is suggested that the legislation should provide that an application could be made by
"anyone who appears to the court to be interested in the company." 30 Courts could be granted, by a revised statutory derivative scheme, discretion as to whether any applicant legitimately fell within the category suggested. The present permission procedure should remain. This would ensure that the floodgates would not be opened as far as applications are concerned. It is submitted that in deciding whether "anyone who appears to the court to be interested in the company" is able to bring a derivative action a court should be convinced that the person has either a direct financial interest in the affairs of the company or a particular legitimate interest in the way that the company is being managed. This approach would chime with section 172(1) of the Act which provides, inter alia, that the directors are to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the shareholders and in doing this they must have regard for several constituent interests that are set out in section 172(1)(a)-(f). At present if the directors breach their duty by failing to have regard for these interests only the shareholders could take action. Normally, they will not do so. Finally, in relation to the subject of this section of the paper it is perhaps worth considering, albeit briefly because of space constraints, 34 whether, and leaving aside the proposal just articulated above, the present legislation should be broadened to allow so-called "multiple derivative actions" (sometimes referred to as "double derivative actions") to be brought 
The Range of Actions
The statutory scheme broadened the range of actions that could be initiated by derivative proceedings at common law, primarily in relation to permitting actions based on the negligence of directors to be instigated. 38 But this has not, and is not, likely to provide any great assistance to shareholders because any negligence claim often involves an allegation concerning the judgment of directors and, traditionally, judges are reluctant to second-guess judgments of directors.
The Canadian, New Zealand and Australian legislation provides no limit to the actions that might be the subject of derivative proceedings. It would be much better if the UK scheme permitted shareholders to bring derivative proceedings against anyone under any cause of action that the company has, and where no action has been instigated by the board. Under the present scheme, the action must be one that arose as a result of the actions of the directors.
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Thus an action that exists because of something that is independent of the actions of the directors cannot be subject to a derivative action. It is unlikely that an action that was not dependent on a breach by a director would be pursued frequently, but there is always the possibility that a board could refrain from proceeding against a third party because that party is associated with one or more of the directors or the controller(s) of the company. The court has the power at a permission hearing to order the company to indemnify the successful shareholder in relation to his or her costs. 40 But, notwithstanding the fact that the Law Commission said that the inclusion of the power to provide for an indemnity was a significant incentive to shareholders to initiate proceedings, 41 in reality there is little incentive for shareholders because any relief that is ultimately ordered by a court will go wholly to the company itself. 42 The best that shareholders can hope for is that their costs will be covered.
Discretion to Order Payment to a Shareholder
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have observed that : "A dominating characteristic of the derivative action is the lack of any link between stake and reward -not only on the judge's part but on the plaintiff's." 43 As indicated earlier, this could be a reason for
shareholders not commencing derivative actions.
To provide some incentive for shareholders it is submitted that UK courts should be given the power that has been bestowed on New Zealand courts by section 167(d) of the Companies Act 1993, namely to :
"make an order directing that any amount ordered to be paid by a defendant in the proceedings must be paid, in whole or part, to former and present shareholders of the company… instead of to the company…"
This would be of particular benefit where the company against which proceedings have been instituted is completely controlled by the wrongdoers and it is possible that they will use any benefit that it awarded by a court in derivative proceedings improperly. The Law Commission did not favour this approach as it said that it blurred the distinction between personal and representative actions. But without such a course of action it might see the virtual demise of derivative actions. And in an event, as discussed later, the courts have, arguably, already blurred the distinction between the two kinds of actions by permitting shareholders to succeed on unfair prejudice petitions when the wrong complained of is one sustained by the company.
Even if an indemnity as far as costs is awarded by a court to a shareholder, an issue to be considered later, it is not as if the shareholder is being granted anything that would give him or her an incentive to take proceedings, but giving shareholders the possibility of a share of the rewards might do so. The payment could be justified on the basis that if the company's directors had run the action against the person who had wronged the company then they would be paid by the company for the work that they had done and the costs would have to be paid by the company, so the applicant shareholder should be paid in a like manner. 44 The benefit ordered where the shareholder is successful only follows the bringing of a derivative action to obtain relief for the company and after the company's board failed to take action.
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Any award to the shareholder as suggested above might not all be "profit" in the sense that the time and cost expended by the shareholder in bringing the action, such as instructing solicitors, attending conferences with counsel, attending to read and sign witness statements, and giving evidence at the trial cannot be recovered and any indemnity ordered in favour of the shareholder might well not cover his or her own costs in full, as some elements of a party's costs cannot be included in a claim against the other party who is ordered to pay costs. This proposal is not new. Arad Reisberg argued for it before the advent of the statutory scheme. His view, which has much to commend it, was that the reward given to the shareholder :
"can be limited to a reasonable percentage of the proceeds and could also be linked to a clear monetary benefit to the company as a result of the action. The court should be provided with discretion to adjust the figure, depending on a number of factors, such as novelty or complexity of issues, quality of representation, risk and the like." if a court grants an indemnity to a shareholder then it should have the right to be advised of any intended discontinuance or settlement and be able to veto it. Such action ensures that the directors and other defendants do not "buy off" the claimant/shareholder and potentially deprive the company of some relief. The legislature's concern over possible collusion between directors and a shareholder in this regard is manifested, for instance, by the fact that section 264 of the Act allows a shareholder to seek permission to continue an existing derivative action where it has not been prosecuted diligently.
If the claimant decides to discontinue or settle the action then the court should have the opportunity of re-considering any award of costs that had been made, certainly in relation to costs incurred after the permission hearing. For a detailed recent study of this topic, see C. Riley, "Derivative claims and ratification : time to ditch some baggage" (2013) 34 Legal Studies 582.
The Place of Ratification
As at common law, the question of whether a wrong has, or could be, ratified might remain critical as to whether permission will be given to allow a derivative claim to continue. 54 Section 263(2)(c) provides that if the cause of action that is the subject of a derivative claim has been ratified then permission cannot be granted to the shareholder. Also, under section 263(3)(c) the court must take into account in its decision whether to give permission the likelihood of the cause of action being ratified if it had not been ratified before the permission hearing.
The law on ratification was described by the Australian Companies and Securities Advisory Committee in its report on the possible introduction of a statutory derivative action as :
"Undoubtedly the greatest legal difficulty with the existing derivative remedy."
55 One commentator has said, in relation to how it affected derivative actions at common law, that :
"the mere possibility of ratification was sufficient to deprive a shareholder of the ability to bring a derivative action." 56 Certain wrongs are not able to be ratified, so the issue of ratification will not always apply, but the danger is, as Tony Boyle pointed out, it may result in leave hearings becoming dominated by arguments over whether the alleged wrongs were ratifiable or not. 57 The case law has not helped. 58 The fact is that the law on what can be ratified is not clear, and so this adds one more uncertain issue to a permission hearing.
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In addition even where the wrong is ratifiable , the court will need to determine whether the conditions for ratification are met and in particular where the purported ratification is by the general meeting, whether the shareholders were properly informed given that the directors who have been engaged in wrongdoing are likely to conceal matters that might result in the shareholder vote being adverse for them: see The better approach would be to remove any reference to ratification in the statutory regime.
This would bring the UK scheme in line with other common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand that do not provide ratification as a factor that can prevent permission being granted for the continuation of derivative actions. In fact the New Zealand legislation does not even mention ratification in the context of derivative actions. While the Canadian legislation does so, 59 it states that the fact that a wrong has been ratified can be taken into account by the court only in deciding what relief it is going to give.
The Australian legislation does include a reference to ratification, but expressly provides that ratification does not prevent a person from bringing proceedings with leave. The Law Commission was concerned in its report in 1997 that its efforts to simplify the derivative action could be undermined by the complexities that arise where an alleged wrongdoing has been or might be ratified. 66 What is proposed here, namely the removal of any reference to ratification, would address those fears.
E. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH
The fact that there have been relatively few proceedings instituted is not sufficient alone to indicate that the courts have been overly restrictive in their approach, because the applications thus far might be categorised as weak or relatively so. Nevertheless, there have been judgments that indicate that courts have adopted a tough approach and it seems that the general approach of the courts, generally speaking, seems to lend support to Reisberg's view, very ready to say that the chief executive officer and the finance director were better placed than he was to assess what was in the company's commercial interest.
71 While the respondents in this latter case argued that these directors were independent, and Newey J appears to have accepted this, the applicant argued, perhaps with some validity, that they
were not independent enough. This was based on the fact that the directors were executives of the company, they had been involved with the company for some time and one of them had been a director of a number of companies associated with the leading respondent.
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The case law appears to suggest that the judges' policy has been to pull back from "an actual assessment of these business considerations into the comfort zone of the law." 73 But when we look at the role that has been assigned to the judges by the derivative action scheme it seems to require judges to decide whether the refusal to initiate proceedings is in the company's commercial interests. Arguably the statutory process inevitably requires judges to make judgments concerning the interests of the company, because every examination by a judge of the directors' decision will often involve, to some extent, second-guessing the judgments made by directors. The statutory regime seems to make it plain that judges must decide for themselves whether the claim that is the subject of the action promotes the success of the company.
Of the 22 cases heard thus far, a shareholder has only succeeded in getting permission or leave in eight of them, which is a 36 per cent strike rate, and in two of the cases 74 permission was only granted until the disclosure stage. The strike rate seems to be very low, especially when one compares it with the Australian position, and even more so when compared with Rupert Reed asserted, before the commencement of the statutory scheme, that masters were reluctant to refrain from granting permission for shareholders to proceed with a derivative action as they did not want to be seen as stifling actions. 77 But under the statutory scheme we appear to have seen the pendulum swing appreciably in the other direction. Perhaps the judges are concerned about a marked increase in litigation, which was a concern of the Law Commission and was one reason for its decision to recommend that court permission had to be obtained is in relation to a proposed derivative action.
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In relation to the situation at common law it has been said that judges were faced with difficulty in granting leave to proceed as the amount of evidence adduced was limited. But under the very formal system that now exists, that situation has been remedied to a large degree. Besides the fact that applicants are likely to produce more evidence than before,
given the greater formality of the permission process, and the fact that if they do not they could fail to succeed at the first stage of that process, courts have, after determining that the shareholder has got through the first stage of the process, the power to direct the company to provide certain evidence, 79 in order to assist them making an informed decisions on the application. 
F. COSTS
At common law the courts were able to order the company to indemnify a shareholder when granting permission to the shareholder to pursue a derivative action. The power to make such an order is now found in rule 19.9E of the Civil Procedure Rules. It provides that a court may order the company to indemnify the shareholder bringing the derivative action against any costs incurred in relation to the permission application or the derivative action or both.
Costs is always a concern in most litigation in the UK, largely because of the fact that litigants can be held liable for the costs of the other parties (as well as having to pay their own costs), usually where they lose, and derivative action litigation is no different. It has been a constant and major problem with such actions. When it comes to quasi-partnerships it was said, before the advent of the statutory regime, that the prospect of a costs order persuaded a shareholder to follow the derivative action route rather than presenting a petition alleging unfair prejudice.
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The case law, under both the common law and the statutory regime, provides mixed messages when it comes to costs. Some cases under the common law process suggested that provided a shareholder could persuade a court, at an ex parte preliminary hearing, that the proceedings were justified, he or she would get an indemnity order for costs. reasonably incurred by him in the course of the agency... Seeing that, if the action succeeds the whole benefit will go to the company, it is only just that the minority shareholder should be indemnified against the costs he incurs on its behalf…" Lord Denning MR almost went to the point of saying that if a shareholder is bringing a legitimate derivative action then it follows that he or she should be indemnified. proceedings. Canadian commentators have even said that the "only compelling justification for a leave requirement is the possibility of interim funding."
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But other English judges, both when deciding matters at common law 89 and under the statutory scheme, have tended to be more cautious when it comes to ordering an award of costs in the context of derivative actions, and the circumstances in which an order is to be made are rather obscured. 90 In fact the recent case law clearly demonstrates that the expectation referred to by Arden LJ in the previous paragraph is not being fulfilled.
In Parliament, when the Companies Bill 2005 was being debated, there were suggestions that the inclusion of a power to make indemnity costs orders in the statutory scheme would act as an incentive to some to bring vexatious claims. 91 This has clearly not been the case. The reference to costs orders acting as an incentive is not a new idea, for from time to time it has been raised, perhaps most importantly by the Law Commission. 92 But, the granting of costs is not really an incentive. 93 Providing an incentive assumes that the one being incentivised will get something additional for the course of action they are taking. But a costs order simply maintains the status quo in that the shareholder has not gained anything, but he or she has not lost anything. This might not be true, of course, in every case as the shareholder might have to pay costs to his or her solicitors that are not covered by the indemnity; in instructing solicitors the shareholder will be principally liable for the costs incurred whatever happens. The broad discretion that courts are granted on the issue of costs "denies the successful applicant [at the permission hearing] the assurance that court recognition will result in the company becoming liable for the reasonable costs of litigating on its behalf." 94 The consequence is that the "incentive" of costs is a mere prospect and is dependent on the uncertainty that is the judicial discretion. 95 The concern is that shareholders do not have any real idea as to when an indemnity for costs will be awarded as there are no guidelines on awarding indemnities and so shareholders do not know whether they are likely to obtain any assistance on costs when contemplating the institution of derivative proceedings. What we seem to get from the cases is that the courts are inclined, if deciding to award costs, to make limited orders, which does not provide shareholders with any great confidence. Thus far no court has awarded an unlimited costs order to any successful applicant. It is submitted that the courts need to be more ready to award an indemnity in relation to the costs of shareholders who successfully obtain permission to continue a derivative action. The position adopted under the present scheme is harsh.
The cautious approach of the courts 96 is manifested by the fact that in only two of the eight cases 97 where the shareholder has been successful under the statutory regime, has the court granted costs, and in these cases it declined to grant costs without limit. For instance, in
Stainer v Lee 98 Roth J ordered an indemnity to a limit of £40,000. In New Zealand the courts have awarded costs in 37.5 per cent of cases where leave was sought, and while this might not seem to be significant, one must remember that courts have given permission in far more cases in New Zealand, so we are dealing with larger numbers, and in 40 per cent of the cases where no order as to costs was made the applicant actually did not seek an order in relation to costs.
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It does seem rather unfair and difficult to understand why a court would deny an indemnity for costs when an applicant for permission to continue derivative proceedings has jumped over all of the hurdles contained in the two stage process. It causes one to ask : what else must the applicant do? The problem is that there is nothing in the legislation or the rules of court that instructs the shareholder in this regard. The concern is that the shareholder is at the mercy of the court's discretion.
100 It has been suggested that to the extent that an applicant succeeds and costs are not ordered to be paid by the company, the company is unjustly enriched (and, possibly, so are other shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders) as it gets the benefit from the efforts of the shareholder. 101 Further, if a court declines to award costs then a successful applicant might decide not to pursue the derivative action and this could mean that the ones who harmed the company get away scot free.
One commentator has asserted that the courts need to engage in a balancing exercise, ensuring that they are not too generous in granting indemnity orders, but not too harsh as this may hinder valid claims. 102 With respect, this might be a fair assertion in relation to the decision as to whether to grant permission or not, but once the court has decided in favour of the applicant then surely costs should be awarded unless there are exceptional circumstances militating against such an award.
It might be argued that courts should not be providing shareholders with carte blanche when it comes to costs, but it must be remembered that the costs that will be claimed by the shareholder as far as his or her costs are concerned and any costs that have to be paid to the respondents if the shareholder loses, will have to be reasonable and subject to judicial scrutiny. Also, parties to proceedings today have to provide costs budgets to the courts at a case management hearing before trial so that costs are monitored and controlled to a greater degree than in the past.
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Other jurisdictions are far more generous to shareholders. In Germany if a shareholder's action is admitted then he or she will be indemnified. 104 The following position applies in New Zealand :
"The court shall, on the application of the shareholder or director to whom leave was granted under section 165 to bring or intervene in the proceedings, order that the whole or part of the reasonable costs of bringing or intervening in the proceedings, including any costs relating to any settlement, compromise, or discontinuance approved under section 168, must be met by the company unless the court considers that it would be unjust or inequitable for the company to bear those costs." This provides a statutory presumption that courts will grant costs, with a reserved discretionary power not to grant costs only where it would be unjust or inequitable. And the way that the New Zealand legislation is drafted it does tend to suggest that there is a greater likelihood of an award of full costs. This might constitute a reason as to why the derivative action procedure has been far more popular in New Zealand compared with the UK. The New Zealand provision seems to fit in with the approach that was articulated in Wallersteiner v Moir (no 2), 106 and if such an approach were adopted in the UK there would be greater certainty for shareholders, and, at the same time, courts could still control the process to a large degree. For reasons discussed in this section of the article it is submitted that the New Zealand approach should be implemented in the UK as it provides greater likelihood of a shareholder being awarded costs, but still gives some power to courts to stop this where it would be inequitable.
G. UNFAIR PREJUDICE PETITIONS
According to section 263(f) courts must, in permission hearings, consider whether the action which is the subject of the derivative claim could be pursued by the member in his or her own right. This has led courts to consider whether a member could present a petition under section granted. 110 According to her Ladyship, the availability of the ground was merely one factor, albeit an important one, to be taken into account in the exercise of a court's discretion.
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While the fact that a shareholder might have a right to bring a section 994 petition is not an absolute bar to the prosecution of a derivative action, there are indications from the judiciary that it is willing to support the use of such petitions when a wrong has been done to the company, and notwithstanding the fact that they provide a less structured form of obtaining relief. This has led to a problem for litigants : on which basis should an action be initiated?
The problem emanates, as Jill Poole and Pauline Roberts have noted, from the failure to distinguish between the wrongs that should be remedied by a derivative action and those by an unfair prejudice action, and this is due to the fact that the courts have not listed the personal rights of shareholders that will be protected by section 994. 112 This is a major issue and while there is not sufficient space in this article to discuss it thoroughly, 113 it is necessary that it is discussed to some extent as it is required in any contemporary assessment of derivative proceedings.
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A derivative action is a representative type action and any relief ordered is to benefit the company, such that it is "oriented towards collective outcomes," 114 whereas an action brought under section 994 is a personal action potentially producing personal benefits for the petitioning shareholder. If unfair petitions are preferred over derivative actions the company could lose out, because it obviously gets nothing, usually, from a personal action.
It was suggested before the advent of the UK's derivative actions scheme that the Canadian experience, where oppression actions far outweigh derivative actions, 115 indicates that there is a danger that the latter will be regarded as more complex and relied on less than the unfair prejudice petition, unless there are some parameters applied to the unfair prejudice ground.
At present there have not been any applied and some are of the view that it has led to the virtual redundancy of derivative actions. Nevertheless, it was pointed out by the Law Commission in 1997 that there were still situations in which a derivative action was the only or the most appropriate way to proceed. 116 The Commission felt that two distinct remedies should be preserved, adding that the unfair prejudice petition has largely been seen as an exit remedy because the usual order sought is that the shares of the petitioner be purchased by the respondent. Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd 119 that section 994 gives "an elastic quality which enables the courts to mould the concepts of unfair prejudice according to the circumstances of the case."
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There have been several claims under section 994 or its immediate forebear where the petitioner claims that there has been a breach of directors' duties. 121 The argument that would be mounted by a claimant is that the breach has unfairly prejudiced the interests of members generally. This is notwithstanding the fact that according to section 170(1) of the Act the directors owe their duties to the company. Some will argue that that this effectively means the shareholders as a whole, but this view existed before the drafting of section 170 and one would have thought that the section might well have said, in common with provisions in the corporate legislation of many American states, that the duties are owed "to the company and the shareholders" if this interpretation were intended.
The unfair prejudice petition might generally appear to be more attractive than a derivative action due to the fact that there is not the same permission process that applies to the latter, and the claimant is able to get a remedy that relates to his or her own personal interests. Also, as a court has complete discretion as to what order it makes, it could make one that benefits the company. But this has rarely been done. 122 In the Hong Kong case of Re Chime Corp
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Lord Scott was of the view that as a general rule courts should not make orders requiring the respondent to pay the company a sum on an unfair prejudice petition. Of relevance is the fact that section 996(2)(c) specifically provides that courts can authorise a shareholder to bring proceedings to be brought in the name of the company. This would, however, involve two 119 sets of proceedings and would, obviously, be more costly than commencing and prosecuting a derivative action. This approach has not been commonly employed.
Looking at the bigger picture, the fact that a shareholder might be able to obtain the usual order sought with section 994 petitions, namely that the respondent buys the shareholder's shares, does not rectify a problem that is likely to be of critical importance to the company, that is, it would not receive relief for the wrongful action taken against it. 124 The resolution as much leeway to section 994 petitioners as they had in the preceding years, and, arguably, the judgment narrowed the ambit of such claims.
129
Notwithstanding the support of judges for a wide application of section 994, some courts have cautioned against the use of unfair prejudice petitions in relation to wrongs committed against the company.
130 In one of these cases, Lord Scott held that it was an abuse of process to use an unfair prejudice petition in order to circumvent the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 131 His
Lordship said that an order would only be made on an unfair prejudice petition that involved a corporate wrong if the order sought corresponded with the order that would have been made in a derivative claim or it was clear from the outset that the issue could be conveniently dealt with at the hearing of the petition.
132
It might be thought that one of the main barriers to a corporate claim under section 994 is the policy that prevents claims for reflective loss. This provides that shareholders cannot recover a sum that is equal to the reduction either in the market value of their shares or the amount of a dividend where such loss reflects the loss sustained by the company. 133 But it appears the courts have allowed some claimants to use section 994 petitions when claims involve reflective loss. 134 The cases where this has been allowed have involved situations where a court agrees to order that the claimant's shares be purchased. acknowledged that there had to be some parameters established for oppression cases 152 as they had a potentially wide operation, and they must not be used to subvert established constraints on the availability of the derivative action.
153
It would seem that there are several potential problems and concerns with permitting unfair prejudice petitions where the company has been wronged. First, the company does not benefit usually by relief granted in section 994 petitions, and hence, the other shareholders do not benefit indirectly; an order providing for a buy out of the shareholder is of no assistance to the company. Also, non-shareholder stakeholders do not benefit. The riposte to that might be that as far as shareholders are concerned, it is up to them to take action themselves. Second, while it might be possible for the court to grant to a shareholder in a section 994 petition his or her share of the reflected loss that the company has sustained, and the court could do this over and over again with subsequent petitions by individual shareholders, it would lead to multiplicity of proceedings in relation to the one wrong, and it could lead to inefficiencies and inconvenience, and, more particularly, the incurring of more costs than if there were one derivative action. Naturally this was one of the concerns that led to the rule in Foss v Harbottle and the reluctance of courts to allow actions other than those commenced by the company. Another problem is that a payment made to a petitioner could mean that the respondent is unable to meet subsequent claims by other shareholders to the same extent.
154
Third, the presentation of an unfair prejudice petition in order to obtain relief for the company would mean that there is no prospect of obtaining an indemnity costs order from the court like there is with a derivative action. A further issue for a shareholder to consider is that he or she would have the burden not only of establishing, say a breach of directors' duties, but also that the action complained of was unfairly prejudicial, and that is not always easily done. the company is an entity that is separate from the shareholders. The exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle and the new statutory regime do compromise that principle, but they do so only to protect the company.
Fifth, replacing derivative actions with unfair prejudice cases means that there is no permission hearing, which, while the permission hearing process might have its faults, it eliminates unwarranted cases. Also, with unfair prejudice petitions there is no judicial oversight and scrutiny (save that which applies to all cases in the courts today subsequent to the advent of the Civil Procedure Rules) which can ensure that justice is done rather than the enrichment of one party. At the moment, and this has been acknowledged by those suggesting that section 994 petitions have superseded derivative actions, that there is no adequate process that enables courts to screen out those actions that are not appropriate, 157 and the hurdles that apply to derivative actions are vital to protect the company where the power to take action is being delegated to the shareholders. 158 It is not possible to discern any intention on the part of the legislature to permit a shareholder to use unfair prejudice petitions to avoid the obstructions placed in the way of derivative claims where the action essentially is to right a wrong done to the company. 159 It has been suggested that new tools have to be designed to enable this to be accomplished, 160 perhaps including an ex ante hearing, as presently applies to derivative actions. 161 The fact that changes to the unfair prejudice procedure have to be made in order to accommodate actions that involve corporate claims surely suggests that it is not the appropriate process for claims that the company has. Is it appropriate or necessary to adapt another avenue for relief when one exists already?
I end this section with what I submit are the adroit words of Hannigan on this matter:
"The important point is that issues as to the appropriateness of petitions or derivative claims are not solely matters of choice for the aggrieved shareholder, but matter of jurisdiction for the court, which in resolving the issue must be mindful of the fundamental principles underlying the rule in Foss v Harbottle, the derivative claim and the rule against recovery of reflective loss.
It is time to develop a workable derivative claim and the courts should continue to be very cautious about allowing corporate relief to be sought and granted on an unfairly prejudicial petition."
162

H. CONCLUSION
It might be argued that the steps required to obtain permission to continue a derivative action are "many and taxing" 163 and that it is arguable that the present regime has short-changed shareholders. 164 The accessibility and flexibility that the Law Commission said was needed for derivative actions does not seem to have been achieved. 165 If anything, the statutory scheme's introduction has stultified the derivative claim. The evidence we have at the moment suggests that the courts have not adopted a different approach to derivative actions under the statutory scheme from that applying at common law. They remain suspicion of them and expediency seems to characterise the permission process. Paul Davies sums it up well when he states : "The statutory derivative action may now be less complicated and unwieldy, however, the priority for the court still remains avoiding killing the company by kindness. Successful claims may be few and far between."
166 This is not a cause for concern if companies' interests are being safeguarded in some other way. The obvious possibility in this regard is the unfair prejudice petition, but a concern is that these petitions could be settled without any court approval needed and with the risk that it affects the company and other shareholders who are not parties to them.
The derivative action scheme has built into it tight judicial control as envisaged by the Law Commission 167 in order to address concerns over an avalanche of actions, and this gives courts adequate measures to deal with abuses, but it has tended to be too rigidly enforced.
Arguably most if not all of the schemes that apply in Commonwealth countries and particularly those in New Zealand, Canada, Singapore and Australia are more generous in allowing derivative actions to be either instituted or continued.
The conclusion that we can draw from the present statutory scheme and the judicial interpretation and application of it is that rarely will shareholders seek to litigate a case under the scheme rather than doing nothing or exiting the company. The latter is, of course, not always an option for a shareholder; it will depend on several things such as the basis on which the company was set up, the relations between the shareholders and what has actually been done to cause the shareholder to become disgruntled.
It has been argued in this article that there need to be changes made to the statutory scheme and the ones suggested herein would give the scheme an effective place in the corporate world and "beef up" shareholders' rights. It would also provide non-shareholder stakeholders with an opportunity to be heard as the article has proposed a wider range of persons who can apply for permission to continue derivative actions. Furthermore, the present scheme has inherited much of the uncertainty and complexity of the common law approach and added obstacles of its own.
168
There are positive things that come out of the reform of the derivative process in the Act, such as the fact that an action might be taken in relation to a wider range of wrongdoing and against a greater range of respondents. But outweighing these factors are ones that have made things difficult for shareholders, such as the retention of ratification as a way of thwarting a derivative claim. Also the courts have, it is submitted, continued to appear suspicious of derivative actions and have denied the continuation of actions and, where applicants have been successful they have been denied costs orders by the courts. Simultaneously the courts seem to be pushing shareholders in the direction of section 994 petitions. It has been argued that there should be a clear distinction made between claims that can be brought under section 994 and those that can be initiated as derivative proceedings, and that the derivative action process should remain viable and accessible to shareholders.
If derivative actions are to be anything other than a dead letter then something needs to be done. What the law has to do is to find a balance between, on the one hand, ensuring that proceedings cannot be brought so as to disrupt corporate life unnecessarily, and, on the other, 
